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“The usefulness of [the concept of the original position] depends on its being combined with a 




This paper provides a new argument for a natural view in distributive ethics: that the interests of the 
relatively worse off matter more than the interests of the relatively better off, in the sense that it is more 
important to give some benefit to those that are worse off than it is to give that same benefit to those that 
are better off, and that it is sometimes (but not always) more important to give a smaller benefit to the 
worse off than to give a larger benefit to those better off.  I will refer to this position as relative 
prioritarianism.  The formal realization of this position is known as weighted-rank utilitarianism or the 
Gini social welfare function, and it is typically classified as an egalitarian view, though for reasons I will 
mention that classification may be misleading.   
 
The argument takes as its starting point the proposal, due to Harsanyi and Rawls, that facts about 
distributive ethics are discerned from individual preferences in the “original position.”  I adopt Harsanyi’s 
framework and draw on recent work in decision theory to argue for relative prioritarianism, which is a 
position intermediate between those that Harsanyi and Rawls each argue for: whereas Harsanyi holds that 
each individual’s well-being matters equally to the evaluation of a social distribution, and Rawls holds 
that only the well-being of the worst off matters, relative prioritarianism holds that the well-being of the 
relatively worse off counts for more than that of the relatively better off but that everyone’s well-being 
counts for something.  I explain how this distribution might be justified to members of a society.  Finally, 
I explain how this argument avoids two worries associated with theories that link intrapersonal and 
interpersonal decisions. 
 
2. Decisions and Social Choices 
 
Decision theory concerns the evaluation of gambles, where a gamble specifies the outcome or life-path a 
given individual gets in each possible state of the world: for example, {HEADS, a short and difficult life; 
TAILS, a long and happy life}.  The question for decision theory is how to aggregate the values of the 
outcomes that are realized in each state, in order to arrive at a value for the gamble.  Social choice theory 
2 
 
concerns the evaluation of social distributions, where a social distribution specifies the outcome a given 
state of the world yields for each individual in a social group: for example, {ALICE, a short and difficult 
life; BOB, a long and happy life}.  The question for social choice theory is how to aggregate the values of 
the outcomes that go to each person, in order to arrive at a value for the social distribution. 
 
There is a structural analogy between gambles and distributions: the role played by states in decision 
theory is played by individuals in social choice theory.  And the aggregation question is analogous: once 
we know which values are to be found in various “positions” (states of the world or individuals), we want 
to know how to aggregate these values to determine a value for the whole.  Thus it is unsurprising that 
analogous answers have been given to the two questions.  Three such answers will be important to this 
paper.  I will explain each of them using an example; the general equations can be found in the Appendix.  
We will assume a fixed population and no risk in the social case.  The assumption of a fixed population 
implies that the “average” and “total” formulation of social choice rules produce equivalent rankings of 
distributions. 
 
Consider the decision whether to quit one’s dull but stable job and instead work at a risky start-up.  If the 
company is amazingly successful (probability 0.01) then one will be very wealthy, feel a strong sense of 
personal accomplishment, have a short and pleasant workday, and be able to travel the world and enjoy 
the finer things in life (outcome A).  If the company is very successful (probability 0.29) then one will be 
fairly wealthy, feel accomplished, and have an enjoyable workday (outcome B).  If the company is 
moderately successful (probably 0.5), then one will have enough money to pay the bills, but the hours 
will be long and boring (outcome C).  If the company fails (probably 0.2), then one will have to instead 
get an unpleasant, demanding job where one is merely scraping by (outcome D). 
 
Or consider a policy (Policy X) that will lead to a particular distribution of life-paths.  1% of the 
population is very wealthy, fulfilled, enjoys a short and pleasant workday, and travels and dines out 
regularly.  29% of the population is wealthy, fairly fulfilled, and has an enjoyable workday.  50% of the 
population has enough money, and works long and boring hours.  20% of the population is merely 
scraping by at unpleasant, demanding jobs. 
 
Utility is a measure of how valuable each outcome is to the individual for whom it obtains.  There are two 
views of how utility is determined—on the one hand, intuitively and in advance of preferences, and on the 
other, from preferences themselves—but the differences between these views won’t matter for this paper.1  
We will assume for the sake of our example that everyone has the same utility function.  So, let us assign 
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u(A) = 1, u(B) = 4, u(C) = 6, u(D) = 7.  We can then represent the two situations graphically, where 
“proportion” stands for the probability of each state in the individual case, and for the proportion of 
people in each group in the social case: 
 
 
  FIGURE 1: Start-up Gamble and Policy X 
 
The first pair of aggregation rules is the individual decision rule maximize expected utility and the 
analogous social choice rule average utilitarianism.  These rules take a weighted average of the possible 
utility values, each value (the height of each bar in the above graph) weighted by the proportion of 
positions that realize it (the width of each bar).  Thus, the expected utility of working at the start-up, and 
the average utility of the society in which Policy X is implemented, is the area under the curve: 
 EU(Start-up) = (0.2)(1) + (0.5)(4) + (0.29)(6) + (0.01)(7) = 4.01 
 U(Policy X) =  (0.2)(1) + (0.5)(4) + (0.29)(6) + (0.01)(7) = 4.01 
According to these rules, equiprobable states get equal weight, and the interests of each person get the 
same weight as those of each other person.  Furthermore, since a higher number corresponds to the 
gamble an individual should prefer or the distribution that is better, we can compare the gamble or the 
distribution with alternatives.  Assume one’s current job has utility 4 for certain, and Policy Y yields an 
outcome of utility 4 to everyone.  Then one should prefer the start-up, and Policy X is socially better.  
 
The second pair of rules is the individual decision rule maximin and the social choice rule maximin 
(sometimes called maximin equity).  Both rules say to choose the distribution that maximizes the 
minimum utility value—the utility value in the worst state in the individual case, and the utility value to 
the worst-off person in the social case: 
 MAXIMIN(Start-up) = 1 
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 MAXIMIN(Policy X) = 1    
These equations represent the height of the first bar in the above graph, or the area under the first bar if its 
width were stretched to one.  Thus, the worst state gets all the weight in evaluating the gamble, and the 
interests of the worst-off person count exclusively.  According to maximin, one should prefer to stay at 
one’s current job; and according to maximin equity, Policy Y is socially better.   
   
Finally, we will be concerned with a decision theory and a social choice theory that both fall under the 
general heading of rank-dependence.  The idea behind rank-dependence is that the weight of a given state 
or of a given group’s interests can depend on the relative position of that state or group: where its 
outcome ranks relative to other outcomes of the gamble or distribution.  For example, what happens in the 
worst-case scenario might matter twice as much as what happens in the best-case scenario, or the interests 
of the worst-off group of people might matter twice as much as the interests of the best-off (even if the 
states are equiprobable and the groups are of the same size).  As a result, it may be better to improve, by a 
given increment of utility, the outcome in a relatively worse state or the outcome of a relatively worse-off 
person—and it will sometimes be better to improve the outcome in a worse state or the outcome of a 
worse-off person than to improve the outcome in a better state or the outcome of a better-off person, even 
if we can improve the latter by a smaller utility increment.  But it also may sometimes be better to 
improve the outcome in a better state or the outcome of a better-off person, if we can improve that state or 
person’s outcome by much more.  Or vice versa—what happens in the best-case scenario, or to the best-
off group of people, might matter more than what happens in the worst-case scenario or to the worst-off 
group of people. 
 
3. Rank-Dependent Decision Rules 
 
There are many examples of rank-dependent decision theories in the literature,2 but I will concentrate on 
risk-weighted expected utility,3 because it employs both subjective probabilities and subjective decision 
weights (in the form of a “risk function”), and because unlike other rank-dependent theories it purports to 
characterize rational preferences. 
 
To understand risk-weighted expected utility (REU) maximization, recall again the above graph.  The 
way it is drawn encourages us to conceptualize a gamble or distribution as including four 
considerations—four possible utility values—each of which gets a weight equal to the probability of 
states or the proportion of people that realize it.  But we can instead conceptualize it as including 
considerations about which states or people realize incremental benefits.  In our example of working at 
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the start-up, the individual will at least get utility 1; in 80% of the states, he will do better than this by at 
least utility 3; in 30% of the states, he will do better than this by at least utility 2; and in 1% of the states, 
he will do better than this by utility 1. 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Expected Utility and Average Utilitarianism, Reconceptualized 
 
In this reconceptualized graph, the height of each rectangle represents the difference between two 
adjacent utility levels (benefits that one might receive), and the width of each rectangle represents the 
probability of attaining at least the relevant utility level (the probability of receiving those benefits).  As 
before, the area under the curve is the expected utility of the gamble.  Thus, we can conceptualize EU-
maximization as holding that the weight of each consideration of the form I might obtain benefits of a 
certain size (in addition to whatever other benefits I obtain) is the probability of obtaining those benefits.  
 
REU-maximization says, on the contrary, that it is up to the individual how to weight each of these 
considerations.  For example, in the above decision, that the individual will get at least utility 1 is 
guaranteed, so this consideration counts “all the way”: it gets weight 1.  That he will do better by at least 
utility 3 is a benefit realized in only the top 80% of the states, and he might care proportionately less 
about benefits that are only realized in some states, so he might weight this consideration only 0.64.  That 
he will do better than this by at least utility 2 is a benefit only realized in the top 30% of states, so he 
might weight this consideration only 0.09.  And that he will do better than this by utility 1 is a benefit 
only realized in the top 1% of states, so he might weight this consideration only 0.0001.  (The REU of 
working at the start-up is therefore 3.1001, compared with an REU of staying at one’s current job of 4, 
and one should prefer to stay at one’s current job.4)  Thus, the top states might get proportionately less 




Thus, the individual assigns a weight to the top p-portion of outcomes for each p, and this is his risk 
function, r(p).  The risk function represents how much what happens in the top p-portion of outcomes 
matters to his practical decision making.  (The aforementioned individual can be represented by r(p) = p2.)  
Graphically, since the width of each rectangle represents the weight of attaining each utility level, the 
risk-function “shrinks” or “stretches” the horizontal rectangles:5 
 
 
FIGURE 3: Risk-Weighted Expected Utility, Risk-Avoidant Individual 
 
This individual is risk-avoidant.  He is more concerned with what happens in worse states than better 
states, and thus holds that the value of a gamble is closer to its minimum value than the EU-maximizer 
holds.  Risk-avoidant individuals have convex risk-functions: as benefits are realized in less likely states, 
these individuals care proportionately less about them.  A limit case of risk-avoidance is maximin, in 
which benefits realized in only some states garner no weight. 
 
Other individuals—risk-inclined individuals—might be more concerned with what happens in better 
states than worse states.  These individuals have concave risk functions: as benefits are realized in less 
likely states, these individuals care proportionately more about them.  (For example, r(p) = p(1/2) is a 
concave risk function, according to which the top 80% of outcomes garner 0.89 weight, the top 30% of 
outcomes garner 0.55 weight, and the top 1% of outcomes garner 0.1 weight.  For this risk-function, 





FIGURE 4: Risk-Weighted Expected Utility, Risk-Inclined Individual 
 
Finally, some individuals—globally-neutral individuals—might be equally concerned with what happens 
in all (equiprobable) states, regardless of their relative rank, and thus will simply be expected utility 
maximizers.  Globally neutral individuals have linear risk-functions: the top 80% of outcomes garner 0.8 
weight, the top 30% of outcomes garner 0.3 weight, and the top 1% of outcomes garner 0.01 weight.  




FIGURE 5: Weight of Top p-Portion of Outcomes 
 
The idea behind REU-maximization is that there are actually three psychological components in 
preference-formation and decision-making: how much an individual values outcomes (utilities), how 
likely an individual thinks various states of the world are to obtain (probabilities), and the extent to which 
an individual is willing to trade off value in worse scenarios against value in better scenarios (the risk 
function).  There are two different ways to think about the risk function: as a measure of distributive 
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justice among one’s ‘future possible selves’—how one trades off the interests of better-off possible selves 
against the interests of worse-off possible selves—and as a measure of how one trades off the virtue of 
prudence (making sure that the worst possibilities are not too bad) against the virtue of venturesomeness 
(making sure that the best possibilities are as good as possible). 
 
The risk function does not measure how much an individual cares about some value, risk, that is not 
associated with any particular state.  Instead, like EU-maximization, REU-maximization holds that all 
value is value in particular states.  But contra EU-maximization, some individuals might be more 
concerned about what goes on in relatively worse or relatively better states.   
 
Furthermore, REU-maximization is meant to be normative rather than descriptive: maximizing REU 
according to a non-linear risk function is rational.  While space does not permit me to go through the 
details of the argument, one motivating thought is this.  Merely determining how much an individual 
values outcomes and how likely he thinks various states of the world are to obtain is not enough to answer 
the question of how he should value a gamble that has some probability of realizing any one of a number 
of various outcomes—determining this is not enough to answer the question of how to aggregate the 
utility values of the possible outcomes to arrive at a single value for the gamble.  Taking an average 
weighted by probabilities is just one way to aggregate, a way that corresponds to holding that the 
importance of what happens in the top states is just their proportion—in short, holding that the weight of a 
possible outcome in one’s practical deliberation is just the probability of that outcome.  But there are 
other ways to aggregate, and no reason to privilege a linear risk function over any one of a number of 
possible risk functions: there is to special reason to be globally neutral. 
 
Of course, there will be some constraints on the risk function: it must set r(0) = 0 and r(1) = 1 (informally: 
a benefit that has no chance of being realized must get no weight, and a sure-thing benefit must get 
maximal weight).  It must be non-decreasing—or perhaps positively increasing—in probability 
(informally: one must not prefer a worse chance of some benefit to a better chance of that benefit, or one 
must positively prefer the latter).  And perhaps it must be continuous.  But, holds REU theory, as long as 
an individual makes decisions according to a coherent utility and probability function and a risk function 
that has these characteristics, she will be rational.   
 
There is more to be said about risk attitudes.  Where a very wide range of risk attitudes are rational, the 
range of reasonable risk attitudes is, though still wide, slightly narrower.  To understand this point, it 
helps to consider similar claims that are made about utility and probability, and to notice that there are 
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two uses of the term “rationality” which come apart: coherence and reasonableness.  Coherence is what 
decision theory is traditionally concerned with.  On the utility side, it allows preferring the destruction of 
the world to the scratching of your finger; and on the probability side, it allows assigning a high 
probability to the claim that a mad scientist is controlling the movements of your finger.  As long as your 
utility and probability assignments are internally consistent, you count as rational in the “coherence” 
sense.  Nonetheless, we tend to think there is something important to be said against these assignments: 
the person who prefers the destruction of the world fails to appropriately track value, and the person who 
thinks it likely that a mad scientist is controlling his finger fails to appreciate the force of the evidence.  
These two people are being unreasonable—though it is difficult to say with precision which values and 
beliefs are reasonable and which are not.   
 
So too for risk attitudes.  The person who always stays at home rather than drive because she considers 
the risk of an accident too great, and thereby who forgoes many good things, will count as coherent, and 
thus as decision-theoretically rational.  But we tend to think that she places too much importance on the 
worst-case scenario, and fails to appreciate the importance of what happens in non-worst-case scenarios.  
We tend to think that she is being unreasonable.  As with utilities and probabilities, we may not be able to 
draw a clear and precise line between reasonable risk attitudes and unreasonable ones, but we can clearly 
point to attitudes that fall on both sides.  The key point is that while some risk attitudes are unreasonable 
despite being coherent, there is a wide range of reasonable risk attitudes.   
 
4. Rank-Dependent Social Choice Rules 
 
Rank-dependent social choice rules are directly analogous to rank-dependent decision theories: they allow 
us to weight the interests of individuals differently depending on their relative position in a particular 
distribution.  The general term for these rules is weighted-rank utilitarianism (WRU).6  We can 
understand weighted-rank utilitarianism by adapting the graphs and much of the discussion in the 
previous section to the social case.  Recall our example distribution: {1, 0.2; 4, 0.5; 6, 0.29; 7, 0.01}.  
There are four considerations to evaluate when evaluating this distribution: that it offers a minimum of 
utility 1 to everyone; that the top 80% of our population gets at least an additional 3 utils; that the top 
30% of our population gets an additional 2 utils; and that the top 1% of our population gets an additional 
1 util (Figure 2). 
 
Utiliarianism, maximin equity, and rank-weighted utilitarianism agree about the importance of the first 
consideration: it affects everyone, so its weight is 1.  But these theories disagree about the weight of the 
10 
 
other three considerations.  Utilitarianism holds that the value contributed by each of these considerations 
is the benefit multiplied by the proportion of the population who enjoy it.  Maximin equity holds that the 
value contributed by each of these considerations is the benefit multiplied by zero (i.e. they contribute 
nothing).  And rank-weighted utilitarianism holds that value contributed by each of these considerations is 
the benefit multiplied by an “importance function” of the proportion of the population who enjoy it.  Just 
as the risk function measures the importance of what happens in the top p-portion of states to the value of 
a gamble, the importance function measures the importance of the interests of the top p-portion of 
individuals to the value of a social distribution.  And just as a convex risk function corresponds to caring 
proportionately less and less about what happens in a smaller and smaller portion of the top states (risk-
avoidance), a convex importance function (the Gini family7) corresponds to the claim that as benefits 
affect fewer and fewer people at the top, these benefits count for proportionately less and less in the 
evaluation of a distribution.  So, for example, Figure 3 (interpreted for the social case) represents a 
weighted-rank utilitarian valuation with a convex importance function. 
 
As should be clear from the above, and as others have noted,8 utilitiarianism and maximin are each 
special cases of weighted-rank utilitarianism.  Utilitiarianism holds that each individual gets equal weight, 
and so the weights of each group are proportionate to the size of the group—everyone’s interests are 
counted the same.  Maximin holds that all the weight accrues to the worst off, so that their interests are 
the only thing that matter.  Utilitarianism places no special importance on the interests of the worst off, 
and maximin places no importance on the interests of anyone else.  For utilitarianism, a consideration 
makes a differences in proportion to how many people it affects, and for maximin, a consideration only 
makes a difference if it affects everyone.  The Gini family allows for a position between these two 
extremes: the interests of the relatively worse off count more than those of the relatively better off, but not 
exclusively.  According to this distribution rule, we ought to help the worse off even if we can help them 
a bit less than the better off—but if we can help them much less, then we ought to help the better off 
instead. 
 
One way to classify these three rules is in terms of the interpersonal tradeoffs we ought to accept: for 
example, if we remove some utility from the worst-off person and add some to the best-off person, what 
does the ratio of these two amounts need to be for the resulting distribution to be at least as good as the 
original?  Utilitiarianism says that the amounts just need to be equal—we should be willing to accept 1:1 
utility transfers from the worst-off individual to the best-off.  Maximin says that the resulting distribution 
is always worse—we can only accept 1:∞ utility transfers from worst to best, which is to say we can’t 
accept any such transfers.  The Gini family allows for some ratio intermediate between these two.  A 
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similar point holds in the decision theory case: when the worst and best state are equiprobable, an EU-
maximizer is willing to accept 1:1 utility transfers from worst state to best state; a maximin-er is only 
willing to accept 1:∞ transfers from worst to best; and a risk-avoidant agent will accept something in 
between. 
 
A note about how the Gini family fits into the philosophical literature on distributive ethics.  Broadly 
speaking, philosophers identify two “aggregative” alternatives to utilitarianism: egalitarianism and 
prioritarianism.  Egalitarianism is identified in two separate ways in the literature.  It is typically 
identified as a philosophical view about the appropriate object of concern in evaluating a distribution: a 
view is egalitarian if it holds that inequality matters in itself.9  This is in contrast to utilitarianism, which 
holds that the only objects of concern are what happens to individual people.  Others identify 
egalitarianism as the purely formal view that the social welfare function is not strongly separable: 
roughly, the difference that some individuals’ interests make to the value of a social distribution depends 
on what happens to other individuals.10  Although not typically made explicit, a common thought is 
presumably that these two ideas go together: if the importance of what some individuals have depends on 
what others have, we must value something other than what happens to individuals, i.e., we must care 
about a “global” value, inequality.11   
 
Prioritarianism was formulated by Derek Parfit because he wanted a theory to capture three criteria for 
evaluating distributions: (1) sometimes giving a smaller utility benefit to the worse off is better than 
giving a larger utility benefit to the better off, (2) because they are worse off, but (3) not because 
inequality is bad in itself—the only relevant concern is the well-being of each individual.12  Utilitarianism 
falls afoul of the first criterion, and the “philosophical” formulation of egalitarianism falls afoul of the 
third.  Prioritarianism meets all three criteria by holding that the interests of the worse-off matter more 
than those of the better-off, where “worse-off” and “better-off” are understood in an absolute sense; and 
prioritarianism is expressed formally by holding that the value of a distribution is its total moral value, 
where moral value is a concave function of utility.  (For our purposes, we could instead formulate this as 
average moral value.) 
 
Weighted-rank utilitarian theories are egalitarian in the formal sense: since an individual’s rank affects the 
weight of her interests, and an individual’s rank depends on the outcomes that other individuals receive, 
then the weight of each individual’s interests depends on the outcomes that other individuals receive.  
(These theories reject strong separability.)  However, weighted-rank utilitarianism needn’t be egalitarian 
in the philosophical sense.  In particular, just as REU-maximization holds that the only objects of concern 
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are outcomes in particular states, but that it is an open question how much each state counts towards the 
evaluation of a gamble, one could adhere to weighted-rank utilitarianism with the following motivation: 
the only objects of concern are the interests of each individual, but each individual’s interests needn’t be 
given the same weight in the evaluation of a distribution.13  Indeed, the Gini family, when supported by 
this reasoning, meets all three of Parfit’s desiderata—the formal difference between Gini and 
prioritarianism being that prioritarianism gives priority to the interests of those who are worse off in an 
absolute sense, and Gini gives priority to the interests of those who are worse off in a relative sense.   
 
To disambiguate, I will call the view argued for in this paper—the view that accepts a member of the Gini 
family as its formal method for ranking distributions and accepts the philosophical claim that the interests 
of the relatively worse off matter more (but that inequality does not matter in itself) as its reason for doing 
so—relative prioritarianism.  The key claim of relative prioritarianism as distinct from philosophical 
egalitarianism is about why the rank of each individual matters.  It is not because we want to reduce 
inequality in itself, as if equality were some value over and above the well-being of each individual.  Nor 
is it because individuals care about what other individuals have—they are not motivated by envy.  Rather, 
it is because the claims of those who are relatively worse off take priority over the claims of those who 
are relatively better off.  The key claim of relative prioritarianism as distinct from prioritarianism is that it 
is relative standing, rather than absolute standing, that determines priority. 
 
5. Social Gambles 
 
So far we have seen that there is an analogy between decision rules and social choice rules: the role 
played by states in decision theory is played by groups of individuals in social choice theory.  But John 
Harsanyi and John Rawls make a more direct connection.14  To use Rawls’s terminology, individuals 
consider their preferences about institutional arrangements in the “original position,” in which decisions 
are made behind a “veil of ignorance,” where no one knows ahead of time their “place in society, their 
class position or social status, their place in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, their deeper 
aims and interests, or their particular psychological makeup.”15  Thus, individuals consider their 
preferences about gambles which correspond to social distributions and in which the possible ‘states of 
the world’ specify which place each of them will occupy in society—about social gambles such as: 
Social Gamble X = {I AM IN SOCIAL CLASS A, wealthy and fulfilled with short and pleasant 
workday; I AM IN SOCIAL CLASS B, wealthy and fairly fulfilled with fairly enjoyable 
workday; I AM IN SOCIAL CLASS C, enough money with long and not unpleasant hours; I AM 
IN SOCIAL CLASS D, scraping by with an unpleasant and demanding job.} 
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Harsanyi considers the situation in which social gambles also include risky prospects,16 but for purposes 
of this paper I will only consider the case in which social gambles include sure-thing outcomes.  Rawls 
considers social gambles not over outcomes themselves but over “primary goods” (rights, liberties, 
opportunities, power, income, wealth, and the bases of self-respect17), which help to determine what an 
individual can expect over his lifetime.  While I will continue to use the term ‘outcomes’, this is meant to 
apply to whatever is to be distributed.   
 
Preferences over social gambles are used to choose institutional arrangements (Rawls) or, more 
abstractly, to compare distributions and determine which is better (Harsanyi).  For example, we can 
determine whether Policy X or Policy Y should be chosen, or which of their resulting distributions is 
better.   
 
What preferences do rational individuals form about social gambles?  Here is a crucial point where the 
assumptions that Harsanyi and Rawls make about the original position differ from each other.  Harsanyi 
holds that individuals assign equal probability to being each individual in the society.  He also holds that 
everyone knows the utility that each individual would derive from each outcome, so that outcomes (such 
as “wealthy-and-fulfilled-as-a-member-of-social-class-A”) can be replaced by a single utility value for all 
individuals making the decisions—which is to say, a member of social class B assigns the same utility to 
$0-as-a-member-of-A as a member of social class A assigns to $0-as-a-member-of-A.18  These two 
assumptions together imply that everyone is considering their preferences over gambles with agreed-upon 
utilities and probabilities.  The effect is to transform social gambles into utility lotteries; for example, the 
above social gamble becomes the utility lottery {1, 0.2; 4, 0.5; 6, 0.29; 7, 0.01}.  Harsanyi also assumes 
that rational individuals maximize expected utility, and the result is an argument for utilitarianism.  If 
Social Gamble X has a higher expected utility than Social Gamble Y, then it follows both that Policy X 
should be chosen over Policy Y and that Policy X has a higher average utility than Policy Y. 
 
Rawls, on the other hand, holds that individuals cannot assign probability to occupying each social role.19  
And as for assigning utility to outcomes realized by particular people, he holds only the weak assumption 
that we can know how outcomes are ordinally ranked—or at least that we can easily determine which 
group is worst off.20  And since he holds that an individual facing a decision under uncertainty without 
subjective probabilities should employ maximin, the result is an argument for the maximin equity 
criterion.21  If we assume that scraping-by-as-a-member-of-class-D is worse than any of the other 
outcomes, then maximin selects Social Gamble Y over Social Gamble X, and so Policy Y should be 




Notice that taking our social recommendations from preferences in the original position allows us to link 
together the intrapersonal tradeoffs each individual is willing to accept—the amount by which an 
individual is willing to make one state worse in order to make another state better—and the interpersonal 
tradeoffs we ought to accept in the case of social distributions.  Harsanyi holds that individuals in the 
original position maximize expected utility, which is to say they are willing to accept 1:1 utility transfers 
from worst state to best state; correspondingly, our society should be willing to accept 1:1 utility transfers 
from the worst-off person to the best-off person.  Rawls holds that individuals in the original position 
maximize the minimum value, which is to say they are not willing to accept any utility transfer from 
worst state to best state; correspondingly, our society should not accept utility transfers of any ratio from 
the worst-off person to the best-off person.   
 
Harsanyi and Rawls differ on four main points.  Harsanyi holds that individuals assign common cardinal 
utility values to each outcome realized by each person (the “interpersonal comparability assumption”) 
whereas Rawls holds that they cannot.  Harsanyi holds that individuals assign equal subjective probability 
to being each person (the “equiprobability assumption”), whereas Rawls holds that they are unable to 
assign probabilities at all.  Harsanyi holds that individuals in the original position form preferences 
according to EU-maximization, whereas Rawls holds that they form preferences according to maximin.  
And each holds that his own resulting distributive rule—Harsanyi’s utilitarianism and Rawls’s maximin 
equity criterion—is superior to that derived by the other.   
 
Whether the rule derived from the original position is utilitarianism or maximin equity depends on 
whether the setup makes expected utility maximization or maximin appropriate.  And, of course, if the 
setup makes a different rule appropriate, then the result will be something else.  As the reader no doubt 
anticipated, we will use the assumption that individuals in the original position maximize risk-weighted 
expected utility to argue for relative prioritarianism. 
 
Given the obvious parallel between rank-dependent rules in social choice theory and those in decision 
theory, it is unsurprising that some work has already been done to connect the two.  Axiomatizations of 
weighted-rank utilitarianism have been proposed that make use of analogous axiomatizations for rank-
dependent decision rules.22  However, individual preferences about social gambles do not figure into 
these results, and in particular none of them assume that the preferences of individual decision-makers are 
captured by a rank-dependent rule.  Indeed, non-EU or non-utilitarian approaches that do make 
assumptions about individual preferences appear to come in two types: derivations of non-utilitarian rules 
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that assume individuals maximize expected utility, and derivations that relax the expected utility 
assumption and derive a rule other than weighted-rank utilitarianism (sometimes utilitarianism itself).23   
 
The only author to consider what follows from the Harsanyi/Rawls approach if we assume that 
individuals use a rank-dependent rule is John Quiggin, who assumes that individuals maximize 
anticipated utility.24  Anticipated utility maximization is formally equivalent to REU-maximization with 
an objective rather than subjective probability function, but it is interpreted differently: anticipated utility 
theory’s “weighting function” (the equivalent of REU theory’s risk function) is interpreted as a measure 
of optimistic or pessimistic beliefs—beliefs that are different from known probabilities.  Quiggin notes 
that if in the original position we make the standard assumption that individuals overweight small 
probabilities of both good and bad outcomes, then we will arrive at policies which benefit both the very 
wealthy and the very poor.  However, he does not think that this approach would be convincing, since 
“there is no reason why the weighting function which would be adopted in choosing between risky 
prospects should be the same one which would be used in social choice”.25  Since anticipated utility 
interprets decision weights as incorrect attributions of probability, it is unsurprising that we would have 
no reason to use these decision weights in the original position.  Indeed, it is only when we have reason to 
think that rank-dependent utility maximization is normative, and to hold that decision weights are a 
necessary “third component” of instrumental rationality that we have reason to hold that decision makers 
in the original position maximize some form of rank-dependent utility.  
 
Before we employ REU-maximization to argue for relative prioritarianism, we need three assumptions: 
two to make REU-maximization appropriate in the original position, and one to deal with the fact that a 
plurality of risk attitudes are rationality permissible, whereas we want to derive a single social choice rule.  
For purposes of this paper, I will simply accept without argument the first two elements of Harsanyi’s 
setup: equiprobability and interpersonal comparability.  The basic motivation for accepting 
equiprobability is that it represents the idea of giving “the same a priori weight to the interests of all 
members of the society.”26  Like Harsanyi, I take equiprobability to be an assumption necessary in order 
for choices in the original position to represent the idea that all people are treated equally, rather than an 
epistemic assumption.  And while there are known worries about interpersonal comparability—
particularly Rawls’s worry that we cannot know from behind the veil each individual’s conception of the 
good—I will simply assume that these can be overcome.  (Even if they cannot, bracketing them will help 
to focus our attention on the ideal case in which we do have interpersonal comparability, so that we can 
see the structural features of distributive ethics.)  The assumptions of equiprobability and interpersonal 
comparability together imply that individuals treat social gambles in the original position as utility 
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lotteries, and indeed that all individuals agree on which utility lotteries they are.  The third key 
assumption will be the subject of Section 6. 
 
A few caveats before we get to the heart of the argument.  First, I am concerned here with the 
distributional rule to employ at the point at which distribution is the relevant question.  Many utilitarians 
hold that the only moral question is a distributional question, and thus that utilitarianism is meant to apply 
at the most fundamental level.  Rawls, on the other hand, adopts two rules—first ensure that everyone is 
to have adequate basic liberties and then employ maximin—and only the second is a distributional rule.  
We needn’t take a stand on which of these two pictures, the one in which a distributional rule is the most 
basic kind of rule or the one in which a distributional rule is secondary to some other kind of rule, is 
correct.  We are simply asking, when we get to the stage which requires a distributional rule, what should 
that rule be?27  Second, I take no stand on whether that which is to be distributed is opportunities, 
happiness, primary goods, fulfilled desires, satisfied preferences, or something else—for purposes of this 
paper, outcomes are whatever entities we’ve decided the distributional question applies to.  What we’re 
interested in is the structure of distributive ethics, rather than the scope or content of distributive ethics.  
Even if this question is too abstract for real-world application, I take it that knowing what the criteria are 
for judging distributions—whether equality is a separate good, for example, or whether an increase in the 
well-being of the middle class contributes substantially to the overall good—will help determine where 
we should direct our attention in real-world cases.   
 
Finally, although we will make use of points originating with Harsanyi and Rawls, we are adapting their 
insights to our purposes, rather than doing exegesis of either author.  As should be clear, although their 
motivations and the traditions in which they are working are very different, we are arguing at a level of 
abstraction according to which they are addressing the same basic structural question.  Indeed, although 
we will draw substantive conclusions about the structure of distributive ethics, one of the purposes of this 
paper is even more abstract: to provide a framework for relating risk and inequality. 
 
6. Taking Risks for Others 
 
So far, we’ve assumed that individuals who face social gambles in the original position assign common 
probabilities to occupying social positions and assign common utilities to the outcomes realized in each.  
We next assume that all of our citizens have preferences for social gambles that maximize risk-weighted 
expected utility.  However, there is a plurality of acceptable risk attitudes; therefore, our actual citizens 
might have different preferences with respect to these gambles.  For example, an actual member of social 
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class D might be risk-avoidant and thus prefer Social Gamble Y to Social Gamble X, whereas an actual 
member of social class A might be risk-inclined and thus prefer Social Gamble X.   
 
How, then, should we think about preferences in the original position, given that there is a plurality of 
acceptable risk attitudes?  Let us start by observing how we make decisions for other people whose risk-
attitudes are unknown to us. 
 
Imagine your acquaintance hurts his shoulder and is in moderate pain, and you do not know whether it is 
a muscle spasm or a pulled muscle.  For simplicity, imagine these two possibilities are equally likely.  
Applying heat will help greatly if it is a muscle spasm, but will lead to intense pain if it is a pulled 
muscle; on the other hand, applying ice will do nothing for a muscle spasm and will provide mild relief 
for a pulled muscle:   
Apply Heat = {muscle spasm, relief; pulled muscle, intense pain} 
 Apply Ice = {muscle spasm, moderate pain; pulled muscle, mild pain} 
Applying heat is the risky but possibly rewarding course of action, and applying ice is the relatively safe 
course of action.  It seems reasonable for an individual to prefer either choice for himself.  However, 
whatever you would prefer for yourself, it seems you should choose ice for your acquaintance: without 
knowing someone’s preferences, you can’t subject him to a risk you’re not sure he would take.  But only 
to a point: if a pulled muscle is incredibly unlikely, then intuitively it seems like you should apply heat.   
 
Thus, we seem to operate using: 
Rule 1: When making a decision for another individual, if I don’t know which risks he is willing 
to take, err on the side of caution and choose the less risky option, within reason. 
Importantly, you don’t simply make the choice that is in line with your own risk-attitude.  Nor do you 
pick haphazardly or arbitrarily.  You would be criticizable if you picked the risky act, even if it turns out 
that this act is the one the acquaintance himself would have chosen and even if his injury turns out to be a 
muscle spasm.  That you would be criticizable points to the fact that we treat making the less risky choice 
as normative. 
 
Exactly how risk-avoidant do we think we ought to be in choices for others?  I submit that the default 
risk-attitude we should adopt when making choices for others is the most risk-avoidant of the reasonable 
risk-attitudes.  When we make a decision for another person, we consider what no one could fault us for, 
so to speak: if no reasonable person would reject an option on the grounds that it is too risky, then we are 
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justified in choosing that option.  Conversely, if a reasonable person could reject it on these grounds, then 
we are not justified in choosing it.   
 
These observations contrast with how we approach decision-making for another person when what is at 
issue is not someone else’s risk-attitude but their basic desires.  For example, if you are picking up ice 
cream for your acquaintance and you do not know whether he prefers chocolate or vanilla, you have no 
rule to guide you.  There is nothing to do but to choose arbitrarily, or perhaps, lacking another way to 
make the choice, to choose in line with your own preferences.  Notice further that finding out that a 
majority of people would prefer chocolate could sway me, even if I know a sizeable minority would 
prefer vanilla; but in the risk case, finding out a majority would take the risk could not sway me, if I knew 
a sizeable minority would not take the risk.  Different reasonable utility assignments are on a par in a way 
that different reasonable risk assignments are not: we default to risk-avoidance, but there is nothing to 
single out any utility values as default. 
 
A final observation about taking risks for another person.  If we know the person’s risk-attitude, we tend 
to defer to it: 
Rule 2: When making a decision for another individual, if I know which risks he is willing to 
take, choose for him as he would choose for himself. 
I leave it open whether Rule 2 requires that we know a person’s risk-attitude in general or in the relevant 
domain or in the choice at hand.  I also leave it open whether we defer when the person’s risk-attitude is 
unreasonable.  Finally, I leave it open whether the factor that allows me to choose the risky option for 
someone else is my knowledge of his preferences or his consent to the choice, though for ease of 
exposition I will speak as if knowledge of his preferences is the relevant factor. 
 
Putting these observations together, we have the following general normative principle:  
Risk Principle: When making a decision for an individual, choose under the assumption that he 
has the most risk-avoidant attitude within reason unless we know that he has a different risk-
attitude, in which case, choose using his risk-attitude. 
According to the Risk Principle, the default distribution among states of a person is one in which worse 
states are given significantly more weight than better states.  In order to transfer utility between states, 
relative to the default distribution, the person who would be made worse off in some state by the transfer 




If, following the Risk Principle, we make the assumption that all individuals in the original position have 
the default risk-attitude, then they can reach unanimous agreement: everyone will choose social gambles 
that prioritize what happens in worse states, and we will arrive at a distribution which prioritizes the 
interests of individuals who are worse off.  Specifically, the weight that we give to the interests of each 
rank-ordered group will be equivalent to the weight we give to rank-ordered states of the same proportion, 
according to the most risk-avoidant reasonable risk-attitude.28  If Social Gamble Y has a higher risk-
weighted expected utility than Social Gamble X relative to the default risk-attitude, then it follows both 
that Policy Y should be chosen over Policy X and that the former has a higher weighted-rank utility when 
the importance function corresponds to the default risk function.  Call this importance attitude the 
designated importance attitude. 
 
Thus, we will arrive at relative prioritarianism, which says to weight the interests of those relatively worse 
off more than the interests of those relatively better off but to give everyone’s interests some weight—and 
to weight these interests according to the designated importance attitude.  When the veil of ignorance is 
lifted and individuals become actual people with particular characteristics, they may instead adopt any 
risk attitude they wish.  They may choose to take gambles which are riskier than the default risk attitude 
would recommend—they may move utility between states of themselves—precisely because it is they 
themselves who will be made worse off if worse states obtain.  But we may not choose social policies that 
privilege the better-off more than the designated importance attitude recommends. 
 
7. Justifying an Ethic of Distribution 
 
We are now most of the way to an argument for relative prioritarianism with the designated importance 
attitude: rational decision makers—risk-weighted expected utility maximizers—with the default risk-
attitude behind the veil of ignorance will prefer social gambles that maximize weighted-rank utility with 
this importance attitude.  But we still need to say why preferences in the original position dictate what our 
distributive ethical principle should be, and in particular what role the Risk Principle plays in the 
argument.  There are two different routes to take here, and we can differentiate them by how they justify, 
to each citizen, the choice of one distribution rather than another. 
 
The first line holds that the conditions imposed on individuals in the original position are the conditions 
under which individual preferences reflect moral judgments about distribution.  (This is how Harsanyi 
makes use of the original position, and why he calls preferences in the original position moral 
preferences.)  Thus, for example, we assume that individuals form preferences under the condition of 
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anonymity—each does not know ahead of time which social position he will occupy—because this 
condition is necessary to ensure that each individual’s preferences are not unduly sensitive to her own 
interests.  We assume that individuals assign equal probability to their being each person because this 
condition is necessary to ensure that each person’s interests count exactly as much as each other person’s 
interests.   
 
In addition to these structural assumptions, there must be assumptions about the content of preferences if 
they are to reflect moral judgments.  One such assumption is mutual disinterest.29  For example, assume 
that actual Alice is happiest when Bob is happy, and so her utility is higher when things go well for Bob.  
If we allow these to be Alice’s utilities behind the veil of ignorance—the utilities assigned in the Alice 
position—then we will give undue weight to Bob’s interests.  The assumption of mutual disinterest is thus 
needed even if it is in fact false of most people.  It is not that we think that most individuals are mutually 
disinterested.  And it is certainly not that we think individuals ought to be mutually disinterested.  Rather, 
it is inappropriate to take actual concern for others into account when we are asking about the correct 
“first-order” distribution: fairness requires taking into account the interests each individual would have in 
the absence of other-regarding preferences.  Once we have determined what claims an individual has to 
various resources, each individual is free to choose to give up his claims for the sake of others—but we 
must first determine what would be fair in the absence of these choices. 
 
Following this line, we add that assigning individuals the default risk-attitude—abstracting away from 
their actual risk-attitudes—is necessary to ensure that individual preferences reflect moral judgments.  
There are two ways to take this line.  The first route is to hold that the assumption of the default risk 
attitude is an assumption like anonymity or equiprobability.  It reflects a structural requirement of 
fairness: the way we balance multiple individuals’ competing interests must be the same way we balance 
a single individual’s competing interests in the absence of special knowledge about her.  Here the 
important fact about the default risk attitude is that it is the attitude we ought to adopt in decisions for 
strangers.  The second route is to hold that the assumption of the default risk-attitude is an assumption 
like mutual disinterest.  We are not assuming that most people have the default risk attitude, or that 
individuals ought to be this risk-avoidant.  We are instead assuming that “first-order” distributive ethics is 
a matter of what we would prefer if we all had the default risk-attitude; once we have settled this first-
order question, each individual is free to adopt whatever risk-attitude he wants for his own choices.  Here 
the important fact about the default risk attitude is that it is default: it is the attitude which an individual 




This line builds a normative assumption into the original position, an assumption about which risk 
attitude is the one from which we derive an ethics of distribution.  But that we start with a normative 
assumption does not mean that we have made little progress in arguing for a normative theory.  The 
conclusion that we arrive at—that distribution should be relative prioritarian with a particular importance 
attitude—is substantially different from the assumption.  What we have shown is that if we start with a 
normative assumption about how we must act on behalf of an individual absent knowledge of what he 
prefers, we can derive a normative conclusion about how we ought to rank social policies or distributions. 
 
According to this line, the way we justify our policy or distribution to each citizen is this: if you didn’t 
know the things that cloud your moral judgment—namely, which individual you are, what characteristics 
you have, and what your actual risk-attitude happens to be—then you yourself would have chosen this 
policy or distribution. 
 
The second line for holding that preferences in the original position dictate our distributive ethical 
principle posits a more indirect connection between preferences in the original position and distributive 
ethics.  This route starts with Rawls’s point that reflective equilibrium is called for: we ought to be willing 
to modify both our description of the original position and the resulting principles until we find a 
reasonable description of the original position that yields principles which match our considered 
judgments of distributive justice.30  More generally, the whole edifice is justified holistically: each piece 
is partially supported by its cohering with each other piece.  Adapting this point to the justification of 
principles about our judgments rather than the judgments themselves, we look at the reasons to adopt the 
Risk Principle, see what they imply about the principles of distributive ethics if the Risk Principle is 
adopted in the original positon, and see whether these principles can be given a considered foundation 
along the lines of our reasons to adopt the Risk Principle.   
 
Let us examine, then, what might justify the Risk Principle.  Why should we default to a fairly risk-
avoidant attitude?  To answer this question, we must explain both why we don’t default to a less risk-
avoidant attitude (e.g., global neutrality) and why we don’t default to an even more risk-avoidant attitude 
(e.g. maximin).  The explanation for both lies in the fact that if an individual ends up in a state where a 
different choice would have been better, then the actual choice (made by her or someone else) requires 
justification.  For example, ending up with intense pain because heat was applied to a pulled muscle 
requires justification for why ice wasn’t instead applied; and ending up with moderate pain because ice 




Thus, justification is required when there is a discrepancy between how things turned out and how they 
could have turned out if a different choice were made.  The required justification will be supplied by 
some advantage of the current choice in a different state.  (“Why didn’t you apply heat instead—given 
that I have a muscle spasm, I would have relief instead of moderate pain?” “Because it might have been a 
pulled muscle, and then heat would have caused intense pain!”)  And the size of the advantage in that 
other state, as compared with the size of the disadvantage in the current state, will be relevant.  And so too 
the size of advantages and disadvantages in other possible states.  But—and this is the crucial point—
ending up in a relatively worse state requires stronger justification than ending up in a relatively better 
state.  (“Why didn’t you apply ice instead—given that I have a pulled muscle, I would have mild pain 
instead of intense pain?” “Because it might have been a muscle spasm, and then the ice would have 
caused relief” seems like an irresponsible answer.)  Thus, we don’t default to global neutrality.  However, 
a discrepancy between how things turned out and how they could have turned out always requires some 
justification, even if one ends up in a relatively good state—if an alternative would have been better, we 
still need to say why this alternative wasn’t chosen.  Thus, we don’t default to maximin.   
 
In the absence of any additional considerations, we default to being more concerned with what happens in 
worse states because of the relative amount of justification needed should these states obtain.  This is 
why, for example, we ought to choose ice over heat when we don’t know anything else about the 
individual’s preferences.  However, if it is worth it to the individual to risk intense pain in exchange for 
the possibility of relief, then we have a new justification that supplants the ordinary justification in every 
state: that it was worth it to the individual to trade off between states in the relevant way.  (“Why didn’t 
you apply ice instead?” “Because the risk associated with applying heat was worth it to you!”) 
 
What is it that makes it worth it to the individual himself to accept a gamble that is riskier than the 
default?  It is that the amount of (prudential) justification he needs in worse states is less than that needed 
by someone with the default risk-attitude.  This presents another reason to identify the default risk-attitude 
with the most risk-avoidant attitude within reason: although some people might need less justification in 
worse states than the default requires in these states, no one could reasonably need more.  
 
To bring this point to the social case: a particular social distribution (or a policy that results in a particular 
social distribution) must be justified to each citizen, and each citizen has a potential complaint if she 
would have done better according to an alternative arrangement.  Thus, we have to answer each citizen’s 
complaint.  Or each citizen has a claim to potential benefits that might be realized by various 
arrangements, and we have to adjudicate these competing claims.31  Notice that what needs to be justified 
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here is not inequalities themselves—the difference between what I have and what you have—but rather 
what we might call disappointments—the difference between what I have and what I could have had 
under some alternative arrangement.  And all disappointments require justification, but disappointments 
experienced by those who are worse off require more justification. 
 
We can compare the story here to that given by Rawls.  Rawls notes that a social distribution must be 
justifiable to all of the citizens, and he holds that maximin meets this criterion but utilitarianism does not.  
He points out that the most disadvantaged will have a hard time accepting “deep and pervasive” 
inequalities.  Utilitarianism asks them to accept their situation with reference to the fact that their having 
less allows the well-off to have still more advantages than they otherwise could have.  For example, when 
we choose a policy that gives the worse-off 10 utils less so that the better-off can have 20 utils more, the 
worse-off are expected to accept this on the basis of the fact that they are giving up something smaller so 
that others can have something greater.  But, says Rawls, this is an extreme psychological demand.  
Maximin does not impose this burden on the least advantaged, because the well-off are only allowed to 
have further advantages if these benefit the worse-off as well. Rawls notes that maximin faces a 
symmetrical problem: the better-off must accept less than they would receive under utilitarianism.  But, 
Rawls argues, two things make this easier to accept: they are “more fortunate and enjoy the benefits of 
this fact; and insofar as they value their situation relatively in comparison with others, they give up that 
much less.”32 
 
The view here agrees with Rawls’s point that we have a particular duty to justify a distribution to the most 
burdened, but adds that this is not our only justificatory duty.  While it will be easier for the better-off to 
accept their situation than it will be for the worse-off to accept theirs, this is a matter of degree rather than 
kind.  For example, the better-off can easily accept a policy that gives them 10 utils less so that the worse-
off may have 20 utils more, and can somewhat easily accept a policy that gives them 20 utils less so that 
the worse-off may have 10 utils more—but they may not be able to easily accept a policy that gives them 
2,000 utils less so that the worse-off may have 10 utils more.  This is particularly true when the worse-off 
and better-off under consideration are not the two extreme groups (the worst-off and best-off), but are 
instead two closely ranked groups: the worst-off and the second-worst-off, for example, or the second-
best-off and the best-off.   
 
When we choose policies that give the better-off less so that the worse-off can have more, these policies 
are not automatically accepted by the better-off, and when we choose policies that give the worse-off less 
so that the better-off can have more, these policies are not automatically rejected by the worse-off.  
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Instead, the requirement that less advantaged individuals be given special consideration should be this: 
policies that give the worse-off less so that the better-off can have more must be much more advantageous 
to the better-off than they are disadvantageous to the worse-off, whereas policies that give the better-off 
less so that the worse-off can have more needn’t be much more advantageous to the worse-off—and can 
indeed be much less advantageous—than they are disadvantageous to the better-off.  And, furthermore, 
the needed size of these relative advantages depends on the rank of each group within society as a whole. 
 
According to this line, the way we justify our policy or distribution to each citizen is this: distributive 
ethics is a matter of adjudicating the competing claims of individuals, and this is the policy or distribution 
that takes your interests into account as much as is fair, keeping in mind that the less advantaged are 
owed special consideration.   
 
If one of these lines is successful, then we have an argument for relative prioritarianism with the 
designated importance attitude.  To sum up the argument, we’ve started with five premises:   
(1) Individuals in the original position assign common utilities to outcomes they would 
experience as other individuals.  [assumed without argument] 
(2) Individuals in the original position assign equal subjective probability to being each 
individual.  [assumed without argument] 
(3) Individuals in the original position maximize risk-weighted expected utility.  [section 3] 
(4) We should ascribe to individuals in the original position the most risk-avoidant reasonable 
risk-attitude.  [section 6]   
(5) Preferences in the original position dictate what our distributive ethical principle should be.  
[section 7] 
And the result is an argument for the following conclusion: 
We ought to choose policies that maximize weighted-rank utility with respect to the importance 
attitude I(p) = r’(p), where r’(p) is the most risk-avoidant attitude within reason.  
In other words, we ought to give more weight to the interests of the relatively worse off than to those of 
the relatively better off; specifically, we ought to give them as much weight as we default to giving to 
relatively worse states in individual decision-making. 
 
It might be that the reader is unconvinced by either of the lines taken in this section.  In this case, what 
one can take from this paper is a template for deriving rules of distributive ethics.  If one can supply an 
alternative justification for the Risk Principle, then this will lead to an alternative story upon which we 
can base relative prioritarianism with the designated importance attitude.  Alternatively, perhaps a milder 
25 
 
form of relative prioritarianism is attractive.  If one instead argues for a version of the Risk Principle 
according to which the default risk-attitude we use in choices for others is risk-avoidant but less so, then 
this will lead to a less inequality-avoidant relative prioritarianism.  Or one might argue for other rules for 
assigning risk-attitudes in the original position.  Two obvious possibilities have already been discussed: if 
individuals in the original position are globally neutral, then we have an argument for utilitarianism, and 
if individuals in the original position are maximally risk-avoidant, then we have an argument for 
maximin.  But there are a number of additional possibilities.  For example, one might argue that 
individuals in the original position must have the risk-attitude typical of those found in our actual society, 
or the median risk-attitude of members of our actual society.  Interestingly enough, both of these 
possibilities will result in giving more weight to the interests of the very worst off, but also giving more 
weight to the interests of the very best off. 33  Finally, it might be that different “risk rules” are appropriate 
for distributive ethical questions in different circumstances, or that some policies can be accepted via 
overlapping consensus among different risk-attitudes.  In any case, what we have shown is that there is a 
natural argument from assumptions about risk-attitudes to conclusions about distributive ethics, and we 
have provided a way to connect the two. 
 
8. The Separateness of Persons and the Shift 
 
I close by briefly suggesting that the argument in this paper can escape two worries that typically plague 
theories linking distributive ethics to individual preferences among social gambles.  The first is that such 
arguments do not take seriously the distinction between persons.34  When I trade off utility between 
different possible states of an individual, the individual losing utility is the same as the individual gaining 
utility, and this is what makes the tradeoff justified to the individual losing utility.  However, this is 
clearly not the case when trading off utility between different individuals: distributive ethics is not 
rational prudence.  Thus, any theory that derives the social case from the individual case by treating social 
gambles as individual gambles appears not to respect this distinction.   
 
On the view here, we can state clearly the sense in which tradeoffs between states of a person and 
tradeoffs between different individuals are not the same.  While an individual is free to venture away from 
the default—he is free to move utility between states—by giving either more or less weight to particular 
ranks than the default risk-attitude would, we are not free to move utility between persons.  (We are also 
not free to move utility between two states of a person without his choosing this.)  On the view here, the 
separateness of persons is summed up in the fact that there is a plurality of acceptable risk-attitudes, but a 
single correct importance attitude.  Furthermore, the view here does not treat distributive ethics directly as 
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a matter of rational prudence: the social choice is not the choice that every man would make for himself if 
he were equally likely to be each person, or if he were to experience all lives.  It is instead the choice he 
would make for himself if constrained to have the default risk-attitude, the attitude that we must have 
when making choices for others.  Distributive ethics, we might say, is rational prudence on behalf of a 
stranger whose preferences you don’t know. 
 
The second worry concerns a phenomenon that Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve call “the shift.”35  
Data suggest that we do not treat interpersonal decision-making and intrapersonal decision-making 
analogously.  Specifically, we are unwilling to make the same tradeoffs between the worst-off person and 
the best-off person in the interpersonal case as we are willing to make between the worst-case scenario 
and the best-case scenario in our own intrapersonal case.  For example, Eric Nord found that experimental 
subjects evaluating distributions of health outcomes counted the interests of the worst-off roughly five 
times as much as the interests of the best-off—but most subjects were not as correspondingly risk-
avoidant.36  Thus, there is a shift between the attitude we take towards distribution among people and the 
attitude we take towards distribution among states of ourselves: a typical person is willing to accept more 
personal risk than she holds societal inequality to be justified.   
 
According to the view here, we can explain the shift as follows.  Individual decisions and social decisions 
are analogous, in that a rank-dependent view captures them both.  However, the weight we give to the 
interests of the worst-off people—the importance attitude we adopt for social decisions—is the highest 
reasonable weight one can give to the worst state in individual decision-making, whereas the weight each 
individual gives to her own worst state is up to her.  And, almost by definition, most reasonable 
individuals will give less weight to the worst state than the highest reasonable weight.  Thus, most 
individuals will be less risk-avoidant than the default, which is to say that they will accept more personal 
risk than we accept inequality.  (Again, although I hold that the default risk-attitude is the most risk-
avoidant within reason, one only need to hold that most individuals are not nearly as risk-avoidant as the 
default to explain the shift.) 
 
Notice that the cited data also lend support to the Risk Principle itself, via the method of reflective 
equilibrium.  For we have now shown that from the Risk Principle in the original position we can derive 
some of our basic intuitions about particular cases, where alternatives such as expected utility 




There is more to be said about the relationship between individual decision-making and social choice.  
But what I have done, in giving principled reasons for a plurality of acceptable risk attitudes but a single 
importance attitude, is to open up a conceptual possibility for thinking about the relationship between 
individuals’ actual risk-attitudes and the importance we ascribe to the interests of the worse-off relative to 
those of the better-off.  Individuals’ actual choices don’t display levels of risk-avoidance analogous to 
intuitive levels of inequality-avoidance in social choices, but nonetheless a certain type of individual 




I have provided an argument for relative prioritarianism, starting from preferences in the original position.  
If we are willing to grant the equiprobability and interpersonal comparability assumptions; and if we 
accept risk-weighted expected utility maximization as characterizing the preferences of rational agents; 
and if we hold that the default risk-attitude is fairly risk-averse; and if we hold that distributive ethics can 
be derived from preferences in the original position, then we can conclude that we ought to give more 
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APPENDIX: Individual Decision Rules and Social Choice Rules 
 
In the individual case, the basic unit of evaluation is an ordered gamble.  Let ≤ represent some 
individual’s preference relation.  Then let g = {E1, x1; …; En, xn} be an ordered gamble that yields 
outcome xi in event Ei, where 𝑥𝑥1 ≤ ⋯ ≤ 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛.  Let p(Ei) be the subjective probability of Ei.  (Notice that 
there may be multiple ordered representations of the same unordered gamble, due to ties.  All ordered 
representations of a given unordered gamble will yield the same values for all of the rules below.) 
 
Let uk(xi) be the utility of xi for individual k.  Where we have just one individual, we will omit the 
personal subscript and write u(xi). 
 
For the social case, we assume that individual utilities are given (or already derived from individual 
preferences) and are interpersonally compatible.  The basic unit of evaluation is an ordered distribution to 
groups of individuals, where groups are individuated such that every individual in a group shares the 
same utility function and receives the same outcome on the distribution—that this is always possible for a 
finite population is shown by the fact that we can simply let each group contain exactly one individual. 
 
Let d = {P1, x1; …; Pn, xn} be an ordered social distribution in which each individual in group Pi has 
utility function ui and receives outcome xi, and where 𝑢𝑢1(𝑥𝑥1) ≤ ⋯ ≤ 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛(𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛).  Let p(Pi) be the proportion 
of the population that Pi represents.  (Again, notice that there may be multiple ordered representations of 
the same unordered social distribution—again, all ordered representations of a given unordered 




I. Expected Utility and Average Utilitarianism 
 
The expected utility of g is: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑔𝑔) = ∑ 𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖)𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)  
 Alternatively,   
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑔𝑔) =  ����𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗)𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗=𝑖𝑖










 Alternatively, 𝐸𝐸(𝑔𝑔) =  ∑ ��∑ 𝑝𝑝(𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗)𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=𝑖𝑖 �(𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) −  𝑢𝑢(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖−1))�𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  
 
II. Maximin and Maximin Equity 
 
The utility of g according to maximin is: 
M(g) = u(x1) 
The utility of d according to maximin equity is: 




III. Risk-Weighted Expected Utility and Weighted-Rank Utilitarianism 
       
The risk-weighted expected utility of g is: 
𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑔𝑔) =  ��𝑟𝑟��𝑝𝑝(𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗)𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗=𝑖𝑖




where r is “risk function” from [0, 1] to [0, 1], with r(0) = 0, r(1) = 1, and r non-decreasing. 
 
(Quiggin’s anticipated utility is obtained by replacing p(E) with a given, objective probability p, and 
Gilboa’s Choquet expected utility is obtained by replacing r(p(E)) with a weight w(E).) 
 
To see the standard formulation of weighted-rank total utilitarianism, assume that each group Pi includes 




where 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 corresponds to the weight that the kth-worst individual gets in the evaluation of the distribution.   
 
Using an “average” rather than a “total” formulation: 
 







The constraints that 𝜆𝜆1 > 0 and (for k < n) 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘 ≥ 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘+1 ≥ 0 correspond to the generalized Gini family.38   
 
In this paper, I’ve assumed that groups can be any size and I’ve stated weighted-rank utilitarianism as: 
𝑊𝑊(𝑑𝑑) = ��𝐼𝐼��𝑝𝑝(𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘)𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗=𝑘𝑘
� (𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘 −  𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘−1)�𝑛𝑛
𝑘𝑘=1
 
where I is an “importance function” from [0, 1] to [0, 1], with I(0) = 0, I(1) = 1, and I non-decreasing. 
 
These formulations are equivalent when we set we set 𝐼𝐼 �𝑛𝑛−(𝑘𝑘−1)
𝑛𝑛




  .   
The generalized Gini family is then given by the constraint that I is weakly convex, and strictly convex if 
the above inequalities are strict.   
 
Utilitarianism is given by I(p) = p.   
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